This article traces different devices and practices (i.e., ultrasound scan, fine needle aspiration and breast examination) involved in the clinical diagnostic practices for breast cancer and suggests that they might be productively considered as "visualization apparatuses." Drawing on auto-ethnographic data and medical literature, it explores how these apparatuses make visible and help materialize a particular bodily configuration (e.g., a simple cyst as a benign breast disorder). In examining side by side the practices and devices commonly characterized as medical imaging such as ultrasonography and the more mundane apparatuses such as syringes or trained eyes and fingers, the article draws attention to the non-given nature of image and imaging, and to the equally non-given nature of the distinctions between vision, touch and hearing as modes of sensing and knowing. In doing so, it seeks to problematize the traditional partitioning of experience into separate and separable perceptual and epistemological modalities, while at the same time reclaiming vision, touch and hearing as metaphors for responsible and accountable knowledge-making. Bringing together feminist (Haraway, 1988; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2009; Barad, 2007; 2012) and post-phenomenological (Ihde, 2007; Ingold, 2000) work on knowledge-making and perception with the concept of synesthesia (Harris, 2016; Hayward, 2010; Marks, 2002) , it argues for a certain knowledge politics beyond "sense atomism," which helps us to rethink not only the apparent distinction in the different sensorial universes but also, more broadly, the questions of knowledge, politics, responsibility and accountability.
Introduction
[T]he medical gaze embraces more than is said by the word "gaze" alone. It contains within a single structure different sensorial fields.
The sight/touch/hearing trinity defines a perceptual configuration in which the inaccessible illness is tracked down by markers, gauged in depth, drawn to the surface, and projected virtually on the dispersed organs of the corpse. The "glance" has become a complex organization with a view to a spatial assignation of the invisible. … The medical gaze is now endowed with a plurisensorial structure.
A gaze that touches, hears, and, moreover, not by essence or necessity, sees. (Foucault, 2000, p. 164 ).
The medical gaze, the cornerstone of the sociological imagination of the relationship between vision, knowledge and embodiment in the space of the clinic (Foucault, 2000) , has long been seen as linking the different sensoria within one perceptual and epistemological configuration. Michel Foucault speaks in this context of the local, "borderline gaze of touch and hearing" practiced by physicians (2000, p. 165) . Applying his concept to the case of a computer tomography suite, medical anthropologist Barry F. Saunders notes how "looking comprises a multiplicity of gestures" (2010, p. 18) . And yet, while other senses might be involved in its "plurisensorial structure," the organizing principle of the gaze and of the clinic often appears to be that of a fundamental visibility concerned with the spatial arrangements of bodies (Foucault, 2000, pp. 164-165) . The practices and apparatuses of medical imaging seemingly contribute to this visual regime as they help produce particular reconfigurations of objects/bodies in terms of sets of images or image data (Prasad, 2005) .
The materiality of these visual arrangements and the devices and practices which help to constitute them has been widely discussed; on the one hand, in the tracing of the conditions of development and production of particular imaging technologies (Joyce, 2006; Koch, 1993; Pasveer, 1989; Yoxen, 1987) ; and, on the other hand, in the careful articulations of the clinical practices in which they are involved (Joyce, 2005; Prasad, 2005; Saunders, 2010) . Contrary to popular imaginaries, the visual in the clinic is not virtual; it does not make the patient and her embodied experience "disappear behind the images" (Blaxter, 2009, p. 764) . Neither is it representational if we are to follow feminist science studies scholar Karen Barad's understanding of representationalism as a metaphysical framework separating the world into "the ontologically disjoint domains of words and things" (2003, p. 811) or "representations" and "ontologically separate entities awaiting representation" (2007, p. 49).
As she notes in her discussion of fetal ultrasonography, the apparatus "does not allow us to peer innocently at the fetus, nor does it simply offer constraints on what we can see; rather it helps produce and is part of the body it images" (2007, p. 202) . In this context, the fetus and the ultrasound image are not separate entities but rather parts of an ontologically inseparable phenomenon constituted in the intra-action of the "object" and the "agencies of observation." 1 Following Barad's understanding of apparatuses as "instrument [s] of power through which particular meanings and bodies and materialdiscursive boundaries are produced" (2001, p. 80) , 2 in this article I want to trace different devices and practices (i.e., ultrasound scan, fine needle aspiration as well as breast examination and self-examination) involved in the clinical diagnostic practices for breast cancer and to suggest that they might be productively considered as "visualization apparatuses." I use this term to refer to these instruments, technologies and practices, which have power to render objects/bodies visible, that is, observable and knowable, but -importantly -only as part and parcel of their own apparatus. These "visualization apparatuses" and the notion of visibility they entail can be seen to encapsulate different optical systems (embodied or otherwise), and the possible configurations of images or image data. But, crucially, they need to be understood also in relation to other perceptual systems and other types of data.
Drawing on auto-ethnographic work, on oncological and radiological literature and on feminist science studies and postphenomenological accounts of sensory perception and knowledge, I want to explore how the three biomedical apparatuses (i.e., ultrasound scan, fine needle aspiration as well as breast examination and self-examination) make visible and help materialize a particular bodily configuration of which (importantly) they are part: a simple cyst, a benign breast disorder.
By examining side by side the practices and devices commonly characterized as medical imaging, such as ultrasonography, and the more mundane apparatuses, such as syringes or trained eyes and fingers, I want to open up for inquiry two important issues related to visualization and its apparatuses.
Firstly, I want to draw attention to and problematize the notion of medical imaging technologies as given and predefined objects or entities.
The non-givenness of imaging technologies needs to be understood not only by recognizing that, as "apparatuses of observation" in the sense suggested by Barad (2003, p. 815) , these technologies are not separable from their objects of investigation but rather intra-actively materialized together with these objects. The non-givenness of these technologies needs also to be understood in terms of acknowledging that, as the objects of inquiry, they are not separable from the specific practices, in which they are located, including our analytical practices. Imaging has sometimes been defined as relating to specific technologies and practices involved in the configuration of images (see, for example, Papenburg et al., 2015) . In this article I want to explore the broader genealogies of three different medical apparatuses, and investigate how some of them (i.e., the ultrasound and its digital display) come to be included in the biomedical imaginary of imaging, while the other (i.e., needles and syringes in fine needle aspiration, or eyes and fingers in medical examination) come to be excluded. In the process, I also want to explore what specific modes of sensing and knowing are involved in making these differentiations.
This last question brings forth the second and central concern of the article. By bringing together these diverse practices and apparatuses, I want to explore and problematize the relationship between vision, touch and hearing as modes of sensing and knowing in biomedicine. In various diagnostic practices for breast cancer, seeing might be understood as always already dependent on different forms of hearing and touching with/in different bodies, both human and non-human (as sonic waves are transduced into electronic ultrasound images; or as the suction of a syringe in fine needle aspiration draws out and makes visible bodily fluids); touch might also be a "listening-touch" (Harris, 2016 ) (as piezoelectric crystals of an ultrasound transducer vibrate in response to electric currents and ultrasonic waves), and both can be understood as visualizing devices, or "haptic-optic" systems (Hayward, 2010, pp. 580-581) , which help render particular bodies and particular bodily conditions (such as a simple fluid-filled breast cyst) visible and intelligible. This insistence on the problematic distinctions between vision and touch, touch and hearing, and vision and hearing is not meant to suggest that biomedical practices and apparatuses are simply multisensory, nor that the different sensoria are indistinguishable as modes of perception.
Rather it suggests that vision, touch and hearing, as modes of sensing and knowing, cannot be taken for granted, as already given, distinct from one another, and from the phenomena, which they render knowable, but are more appropriately understood as such in particular instances of seeing/touching/hearing/knowing and in relation to specific practices and apparatuses.
In this article I therefore seek to problematize the traditional partitioning of experience into separate and separable perceptual and epistemological modalities while at the same time reclaiming vision, touch and hearing as metaphors for responsible and accountable knowledgemaking. Drawing on the feminist tradition of situated knowledges (Haraway, 1988) and response-ability (Barad, 2007; 2012) and on nonatomist (Ihde, 2007; Ingold, 2000) or synesthetic understandings of sense and experience (Harris, 2016; Hayward, 2010; Marks, 2002) The reversibility of touching contact, the possibility of "being-in-touchwith" oneself and another, of being materially involved with/in the tangible world in its ongoing transformations -these seem to be the promises of touch as a sensorial universe and as a metaphor for knowledge-making. where the other and the self are not already given but constituted in mutual "response-ability." Touch is thus a matter of responsibility understood not as an obligation of the self toward the other but as a relation integral to the ongoing worldly materializations within which the self and the other are articulated and materialized (Barad, 2007, p. 265) . It is the responsibility for these articulations and materializations, for the material consequences of our world-shaping (touching) visions, that marks feminist knowledge politics.
4
The feminist projects of reclaiming vision and touch have been paralleled by the anthropological and post-phenomenological work revaluing the significance of hearing as a mode of sensing and making sense of the world (Ingold, 2000; Ihde, 2007; Rice, 2008) . The "auditory turn" (Ihde, 2007) has looked to sound and hearing as a way for a more participatory and relational engagement between subjects and objects:
listening to the voice of the other, giving voice, being immersed in a shared stream of sound, traversing the boundaries of inside/outside. As touch before, hearing seems to suggest the possibility of redressing the distancing and objectifying orderings of vision: " [T] here is an old and deeply held tradition that vision 'objectifies', and, contrarily but not so widely noted, there is also a tradition which holds that sound 'personifies'" (Ihde, 2007, p. 21) . He further argues that it is only through this "narrow conception of thought" (p. 287) that vision had come to be seen as an objectifying sense and thus opposed to the seemingly more participatory mode of hearing. Drawing attention to sound and hearing opens up a possibility for intervening into this limited understanding of vision and knowledge.
The "auditory turn" thus constitutes not only the reclaiming of sound and hearing, but also the reclaiming of vision as a field of sensory experience, and as a metaphor for thought.
Knowledge Politics beyond "Sense Atomism"
Crucial for Ihde's (2007) and Ingold's (2000) understanding of knowledge and perception is the resistance to "sense atomism" or the partitioning of experience into separate and separable modes of sensing. 6 Drawing on phenomenological understandings of experience, these authors suggest that in the actual sensory and perceptual practices seeing, touching and hearing are not distinct activities but intermingled aspects of the bodily engagement with/in the world. This problematic separation of the different modes of sensing has often been illustrated by the phenomenon of synesthesia, that is, the capacity to perceive a sensation related to a particular sensory modality in response to a stimulation of another (e.g., seeing certain forms or colors on hearing particular sounds). As Ingold (2000, p. 268) notes, the very category of synesthesia relies on and further reproduces "a two-fold distinction between sensation and perception on the one hand, and between discrete sensory modalities on the other." But, as illustrated by such synesthetic concepts as "haptic visuality" (Marks, 2002) , "fingeryeyes" (Hayward, 2010) and "listeningtouch" (Harris, 2016) , the notion of synesthesia nevertheless introduces the possibility of disrupting these distinctions, and in doing so, contributes to a non-atomist, non-representationalist, response-able politics of knowledge.
Media theorist Laura Marks uses the concept of "haptic visuality"
to trouble the separation between vision and touch. On her account, which is expressed in and generates particular textures of the world (p. 582). In this understanding of sense and sensory experience, the eyes and the fingers and, equally, the tentacles, are not seen as distinct organs of perception but rather as inseparable from (within) the body's sensorium. Vision and touch are amalgamated and slide into each other as fingers and eyes and tentacles converge in moments of sensitization.
Importantly, in these instances of sensing, species do not simply react to one another and to their environment, rather they manifest "with and of" the environment and the other, thus constituting "a sensorial ensemble" (p. 593). The notion of "fingeryeyes" thus troubles the sensory, bodily and species boundaries while also hinting at the power relations inherent in the embodied haptic optics:
Cross-species sensations are always mediated by power that leaves impressions, which leaves bodies imprinted and furrowed with consequences. Animal bodies -the coral's and mine -carry forms of domination, communion, and activation into the folds of being. (p. 592)
As such, it calls forth and makes space for response-ability in sensing and knowledge-making.
Coming from the field of medical anthropology, Anna Harris's concept of "listening touch" offers parallel insights into the distributed nature of sensation and the permeability of bodily boundaries (2016).
Exploring the ways in which medical students are taught and acquire the skills necessary for the clinical technique of percussion, she suggests that listening and touch are not confined to and experienced through their respective organs of the ears and the fingers, rather they constitute a form of "body-listening touch" (p. 42). As the training physicians pay attention to the pitch as well as the vibration of the percussed bodies, the auditory and tactile experiences become intertwined within the movements of the sensing body: "Listening-touch in percussion is not a single moment. As the finger-hand-wrist moves, the ear anticipates. The body works in coordination and listening-touch is distributed throughout the technique" (pp. 37-38). Interestingly, for Harris the concept of "listening-touch" problematizes not only the distinction between touch and hearing. Similarly to haptic optics and its diffractive touching visions, it also helps to trouble the separation between the subjects and objects of perception, as (in the case of self-percussion, an important technique for clinical training) the percussing bodies also become the resonating ones.
The synesthetic notions of "haptic visuality," "fingeryeyes" and "listening-touch" contribute to a conception of knowledge politics beyond "sense atomism" as they challenge the representationalist and individualist -in the sense suggested by Barad (2003 ), Ingold (2000 or Ihde (2007) -metaphysical approaches which separate subjects and objects of perception and divide sensation into distinct domains of different senses and their respective organs. These concepts do not simply imply that perception is multisensory or multimodal; they also indicate the inherent intra-activity of sensory practices which are also, importantly, knowledge practices. Writing about the "robotic tactility" feminist science studies scholar Claudia Castañeda (2001) suggests that touch cannot be understood in any general abstract terms as a given.
Rather it needs to be seen as constituted through particular embodied As I read in a medical textbook on breast imaging:
The most common sonolucent mass in the breast is the simple cyst. To make an accurate diagnosis of a benign cyst, strict criteria should be observed. Cysts should have sharply defined walls.
They may be round, ovoid, or lobulated and appear solitary or in groups. Cysts should have no internal echoes. (Kopans, 2007, p. 585) "Sonolucent" is a term used in ultrasonography to describe that which allows a through-transmission of ultrasonic waves without reflecting them back to their source, that is, without producing any echoes. In practice, and very much against its etymology (Latin sonus "sound" and lucere "to shine"), this term is used to characterize these areas of the ultrasound image that appear black and non-reflective, rather than bright with the reflected sound waves. These are the (silent) black spots among the (echoing) grey swirls.
The complex genealogies of ultrasonography have been widely acknowledged: from its roots in the developments of military sonar and radar technologies through its early applications in medicine, where it focused on therapeutic rather than diagnostic uses, to its particular implications for female bodies and subjectivities both in the testing of its early apparatuses on breast cancer patients and in its ongoing, pervasive use in obstetrics (Cartwright, 1992; Duden, 1993; Koch, 1993; Mitchell, 2001 ).
What has also been noted is the particular, non-optical nature of its vision (Barad, 1998; . Ultrasound imaging does not rely on the properties and behavior of light; its seeing and making visible is instead dependent on the emission, reflection and absorption of the high frequency sound waves transmitted to a body through the direct contact with a transducer, converted into electric currents, calculated by a computer and, finally, displayed in a visual form as a two-(or three-or four-) dimensional image. This -in the words of sociologist of science Edward Yoxen (1987) -is "seeing with sound" (p. 281). But, equally, it could be considered a form of "listening-touch": as the ultrasound transducer slides over a gel-covered body, its piezoelectric crystals vibrate in response to the electric currents and to the ultrasonic waves which pass through and are diffracted by the tissues. This way of imaging through sound and touch, which displays sonographic data in terms of spatial relations between differently echoing tissues, owes much to medicine's earlier visual traditions, such as X-ray imaging (Koch, 1993) and anatomical drawings of the cross-sections of different body parts (Yoxen, 1987) . But, as the history of ultrasonography suggests, this way of imaging was not the only one possible or even considered. The early ultrasonic devices developed by John Wild and tested on women with different breast lesions presented sonographic data in reference to their different acoustic behaviors as plotted on a diagram (Koch, 1993) and, as such, did not contribute as easily to the imaginary of a body opened up for visual inspection.
For, as Barad (2007) the referral is considered non-urgent. My self-knowledge is meant to be the result of being "breast aware," that is -to quote a leaflet produced by the Breast Cancer Care charity -"getting to know how your breasts look and feel so you know what is normal for you" and, therefore, can be "more confident about noticing any unusual changes that may be a symptom of breast cancer" (2016, p. 11). In the breast cancer earlydetection campaigns, breast awareness had superseded breast selfexamination (BSE): "a regular, repetitive monthly palpation to a rigorous set method performed by the woman at the same time each month" (Thornton & Pillarisetti, 2008 , p. 2119 .
The genealogies of BSE and breast awareness are quite complex.
While the idea of examining breasts for small lumps had been tentatively promoted throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the notion of BSE was introduced and gained momentum in the 1950s with the joint campaign by the American Cancer Society and National Cancer Institute (Lerner, 2001) . Inspired by the success of the Pap smear for the early detection of cervical cancer, BSE was intended as a similarly life-saving screening method for breast cancer at the time when other techniques (such as mammography)
were not yet fully developed. Controversial from its very inception due to the often sexualized images of the female body used in its promotion, and the inducing of the fear of cancer among healthy women (Lerner, 2001) , since the 1970s BSE has come under growing scientific scrutiny because it has been linked to the increased numbers of benign lumps identified and biopsies performed but not to the reduction in breast cancer mortality and morbidity (Thornton & Pillarisetti, 2008) . Deemed harmful to women and burdensome to health services, BSE has since been largely rejected in favor of breast awareness the clinical benefits of which are still debated, but which, nevertheless -as evidenced by the Breast Cancer Care leaflet -is currently encouraged as a cancer-screening tool among so-called "well women" (Thornton & Pillarisetti, 2008) .
In contrast to the rigorous palpation of BSE, being breast aware means assessing both tactile and visual cues, looking not only for lumps and swellings inside the breast but also for any changes in its outward appearance. In fact, out of the eight changes that should be looked for, according to the Breast Cancer Care leaflet (2016, pp. 13-14) , only two ("a lump or area that feels thicker than the rest of the breast" and "a swelling in your armpit or around your collarbone") refer to symptoms that could be experienced specifically through palpation while the remaining six ("a change in size or shape" of the breast; "a change in skin texture such as puckering or dimpling"; "redness or a rash on the skin and/or around the nipple"; "your nipple has become pulled in or looks different"; "liquid that comes from the nipple without squeezing"; and "pain in your breast or your armpit that's there all or almost all the time") rely on various sensory signals, including a more general sensation of pain.
Despite that, through genealogical links with its discredited predecessor BSE, the practice of breast awareness and its role in early cancer detection is still considered predominantly in terms of "touching and finding" (Thornton & Pillarisetti, 2008 , p. 2119 , rather than seeing or making visible.
In the breast clinic, the physical examination precedes the ultrasound scan and the fine needle aspiration. In some cases (but not in mine), it might be all that is required. As the trained eyes and hands or, to use Hayward's (2010) 
Conclusion
Writing about technoscience and its "visual hermeneutics," Ihde (2009) describes imaging technologies as postmodern equivalents of the camera obscura, as they powerfully shape and make possible specific ways of visualizing and imagining the world. As he notes, these ways of seeing involve a reconfiguration of non-visual phenomena into visual ones by exaggerating "a kind of magnification/reduction distortion into monosensory dimensions" (p. 467), which obscures but does not eliminate the "whole body experience." In her reading of the camera obscura, and other versions of "the technological eye", Haraway suggests that the camera needs to be understood not only as "an analogy to the seeing eye in brainy, knowing man, for whom body and mind are suspicious strangers," but also, and perhaps more importantly, anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of my work and helpful suggestions on how to clarify its arguments. I would also like to thank the participants of the Authors' Workshop at 7 th New Materialism Annual Conference "Performing Situated Knowledges: Space, Time, Vulnerability", Warsaw, Poland, 21-23 September 2016, and the participants at the "New Materialisms and Politics" Workshop at the University of Aberdeen, 21-22 September 2017, for their comments and reactions to the earlier drafts of this article.
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